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PLANNERS GONE WILD: THE OVERREGULATION OF 
PARKING 
The High Cost of Free Parking.  By Donald C. Shoup.  Planners 
Press, 2005. 752 pages.  $59.95. 
 
Michael Lewyn† and Shane Cralle†† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the 1940s, most American cities have required 
landowners to provide customers, visitors, and guests with free off-
street parking.1  Courts have generally upheld these requirements 
against constitutional challenges.2  In The High Cost of Free Parking, 
Donald Shoup asserts that off-street parking requirements make 
cities more automobile-dependent, subsidize driving, make housing 
less affordable, and discourage redevelopment of older buildings.  
Part II of this review addresses Shoup’s critique of the status quo, 
while Part III discusses his rebuttals to possible defenses of current 
regulations. 
 
        † Assistant Professor, Florida Coastal School of Law.  B.A., Wesleyan 
University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
      ††  Law Clerk, Judge Robert Chambers, U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of West Virginia.  B.A., University of Virginia; J.D., George Washington 
University Law School. 
 1. See DONALD C. SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING 22, 25 (2005) 
(noting that in 1946, only seventeen percent of a sample of cities surveyed had 
parking requirements, while by 1951, seventy-one percent of cities had parking 
requirements or were in the process of adopting them; today, off-street parking 
requirements are so common as to be one of “three basic sets of regulations” that 
are virtually universal).  Shoup notes that “parking is free for ninety-nine percent 
of all automobile trips in the U.S.”  Id. at 1.  In fact, some cities explicitly require 
that off-street parking provided by landowners be free.  Id. at 24. 
 2. See, e.g., Cent. Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 392 F.2d 549, 
550–51 (5th Cir. 1968); Stroud v. City of Aspen, 532 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1975). 
1
Lewyn and Cralle: Planners Gone Wild: The Overregulation of Parking
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
5. LEWYN - RC.DOC 2/27/2007  5:23:42 PM 
614 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
II. THE STATUS QUO AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
According to the American Planning Association,3 cities 
require parking for at least 662 different land uses.4  For example, 
most cities require office buildings to provide visitors and 
employees with four parking spaces per 1000 square feet.5  Because 
four parking spaces generally occupy at least 1200 square feet,6 
commercial landowners must often provide more space for parking 
than for offices.  Similarly, cities often require large amounts of 
parking for shopping centers and other commercial uses.7 
Parking requirements for residential housing are equally rigid.  
For example, the city code of Houston, Texas requires landowners 
to provide 1.25 parking spaces for every studio apartment and 1.33 
parking spaces for every one-bedroom apartment—even though 
seventeen percent of Houston’s renters do not have even one car 
in their households.8 
At first glance, government-mandated parking lots 
surrounding offices, shops and apartments may seem like a costless 
convenience for drivers.  But Shoup points out that minimum 
parking requirements create a variety of social costs that may 
exceed this benefit. 
A. Degraded Urban Form 
As a result of minimum parking requirements, landowners 
typically surround offices, shops and apartments with parking lots, 
thus creating a “strip mall” effect.9  Government-mandated strip 
 
 3. See Michael Lewyn, Twenty-First Century Planning and the Constitution, 74 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 651, 651 (2003) (describing the APA as a national organization of 
land-use planners). 
 4. See SHOUP, supra note 1, at 76. 
 5. Id. at 31. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Michael Lewyn, How Overregulation Creates Sprawl (Even In a City Without 
Zoning), 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1171, 1183 (2005) (describing a variety of parking rules 
under the Houston, Texas city code). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1183 n.82.  In Houston, “most shopping centers and restaurants are 
designed with parking out front, creating a strip mall effect.”  Id.  Parking lots are 
generally in front of buildings because of the combination of minimum parking 
requirements and city ordinances requiring buildings to be set back from the 
street.  Id.  The “strip mall effect” exists partially because Houston requires 
commercial buildings to be twenty-five feet from the street or sidewalk.  Id.  See also 
JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE 138 (1996) (noting that setback 
laws generally “keep buildings far away from the street in order to create parking 
2
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malls create a sprawling, automobile-dependent urban form, by 
surrounding streets with a sea of parking.  An Environmental 
Protection Agency report states that where buildings are set back 
behind yards of parking rather than being “flush with the 
sidewalk,”10 a pedestrian “has less to look at [and] feels more 
isolated.”11  By contrast, “small setbacks and shopfront windows 
provide more interesting scenery for pedestrians and create a 
feeling of connection between the buildings and the public spaces 
bordering them.”12  Moreover, parking lots in front of buildings 
lengthen pedestrians’ commutes by increasing the distance 
between streets and destinations such as offices and shops.13  Where 
parking is in front of a shop or office, pedestrians cannot approach 
their destination without trudging through a parking lot, dodging 
cars with every step.14 
B. More Parking = Lower Density = Increased Automobile Dependence 
Minimum parking requirements artificially disperse 
population because land devoted to parking cannot be used for 
housing or businesses.  For example, in 1961, Oakland, California 
began to require one parking space per dwelling unit for 
apartment buildings.15  Within just three years, the number of 
apartments per acre fell by thirty percent.16  The effects of parking 
 
lots all around the building”).  If a landowner has to place something in front of a 
building, she might as well install a parking lot that customers can use, rather than 
installing something merely decorative such as landscaping—and as long as the 
landowner has to install a parking lot, she might as well place the lot in front of 
her property where motorists can easily see it.  See SHOUP, supra note 1, at 107 
(noting that parking in front of buildings is more convenient for motorists than 
rear parking). 
 10. REID EWING, SMART GROWTH NETWORK, PEDESTRIAN- AND TRANSIT-FRIENDLY 
DESIGN: A PRIMER FOR SMART GROWTH 10, http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/pdf/ 
ptfd_primer.pdf. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Douglas G. French, Cities Without Soul: Standards for Architectural Controls 
with Growth Management Objectives, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267, 280 (1994). 
 13. See Robert H. Freilich, The Land Use Implications of Transit-Oriented 
Development: Controlling the Demand Side of Transportation Congestion and Urban 
Sprawl, 30 URB. LAW. 547, 557 (1998) (“[L]arge expanses of asphalt devoted to 
parking often discourage pedestrian mobility” and make public transit 
inconvenient by impeding walking to and from transit stations). 
 14. See Gregory Smith, Two Buildings Face Wrecking Ball for More Parking Space, 
PROVIDENCE J. (Rhode Island), Nov. 4, 2002, at B1 (parking lots “force pedestrians 
to dodge vehicles crossing the sidewalk”). 
 15. SHOUP, supra note 1, at 143. 
 16. Id. at 144. 
3
Lewyn and Cralle: Planners Gone Wild: The Overregulation of Parking
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
5. LEWYN - RC.DOC 2/27/2007  5:23:42 PM 
616 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
upon job density are even more extreme: more than half of 
downtown Buffalo, for example, is devoted to parking.17 
Such government-created low-density areas effectively force 
Americans into their cars for two reasons.  First, if each apartment, 
shop, or office consumes large amounts of land, fewer of these 
destinations can be placed within a short walk of each other.18  
Thus, anti-density parking regulations reduce the number of 
people who can walk to errands or jobs. 
Second, in low-density areas, very few people will live within 
walking distance of a bus or train stop, which in turn means that 
very few people can conveniently use a bus or train.19  By contrast, 
more compact neighborhoods increase transportation choices 
because more people in an area means more potential riders 
within a short walking distance of a bus or train stop. 
C. Subsidized Driving 
While roads are at least partially paid for by user fees,20 parking 
is nearly always “free” to its users.21  But, such “free” parking is in 
fact paid for by landowners, who build parking lots and pass the 
costs of those parking lots on to society as a whole in the form of 
higher rents, and by their tenants, who (if they are businesses) then 
pass the costs on to society as a whole in the form of higher prices 
for goods and services.22  Thus, minimum parking requirements are 
 
 17. Id. at 130–31 (also citing other examples of parking-dominated 
downtowns). 
 18. Cf. Andres Duany & Emily Talen, Making the Good Easy: The Smart Code 
Alternative, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1445, 1447 (2002) (by contrast, in a 
neighborhood organized around the “mobility pattern of the pedestrian,” most 
residents should live no more than a quarter of a mile from stores and schools). 
 19. See Freilich, supra note 13, at 552 n.18 (“[I]n order to effectively 
encourage transit utilization, a development must be located so that residents are 
not required to walk a distance of greater than a quarter mile to a transit station” 
otherwise “commuters are required to travel too far to transit stations.”); see also 
EWING, supra note 10, at 5–6. 
 20. See Salvatore Massa, Surface Freight Transportation: Accounting for Subsidies in 
a “Free Market”, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 318 (2000–01) (noting that over 
half of state and federal highway spending is paid for by user fees). 
 21. See SHOUP, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining that ninety-nine percent of 
American auto trips involve free parking). 
 22. Shoup explains that: 
Initially the developer pays for the required parking, but soon the 
tenants do, and then their customers, and so on, until the cost of parking 
has diffused everywhere in the economy.  When we shop in a store, eat in 
a restaurant, or see a movie, we pay for parking indirectly because its cost 
4
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essentially a sort of tax that redistributes money from society as a 
whole to drivers (or, phrased another way, from Americans in their 
roles as workers and business owners to their roles as drivers).23 
How large is this tax?  According to one 2002 study cited by 
Shoup, the cost of an average parking space is about $127 per 
month.24  Assuming that a commuter drives to work twenty-two days 
each month, that commuter receives a parking subsidy of $5.77 per 
day to park free ($127/22).25  Given that the same commuter 
spends far less than $5.77 to drive to work,26 government-mandated 
free parking gives drivers more of a subsidy than would 
government-mandated free gasoline. 
The same study estimates that the total social cost of free off-
street parking is between $127 and $374 billion27—as much as the 
federal government spent on national defense ($349 billion) or 
Medicare ($231 billion) at the time of the study.28  Given that a one 
cent per gallon gasoline tax increase would increase gasoline tax 
revenues by $1 billion per year, it would take an increase of as 
much as $3.74 in the gasoline tax to offset the social cost of off-
street parking.29 
In sum, government-mandated free parking provides a huge 
subsidy to drivers, which means that government-mandated free 
 
is included in the price of merchandise, meals and theater tickets.  We 
unknowingly support our cars with almost every commercial transaction 
we make because a small share of the money changing hands pays for 
parking. 
Id. at 2. 
 23. Id.  (“We don’t pay for parking in our roles as motorists, but in all our 
other roles—as consumers, investors, workers, residents and taxpayers—we pay a 
high price.  Even people who don’t own a car have to pay for ‘free’ parking.”). 
 24. Id. at 185–91 (explaining the logic behind the estimate).  Shoup notes 
that many commercial spaces cost even more (perhaps $141 to $200 per month).  
Id. at 192. 
 25. Id. at 212. 
 26. In 2001, the average American commuter had a twenty-six-mile round trip 
commute and a car using twenty miles per gallon, and thus used up 1.3 gallons of 
fuel per day.  Id. at 213 (noting that these are average commute and mileage 
lengths in the United States).  Although gas prices fluctuate, as of the date of this 
writing (January 2007) gas prices are about $2.00–2.50 per gallon (with a 
nationwide average of $2.23 per gallon), so the hypothetical commuter cited 
above would pay approximately $2.60–3.25 per day.  See GasBuddy, http://www. 
gasbuddy.com (last visited January 15, 2007). 
 27. See SHOUP, supra note 1, at 205–07 (explaining the basis for this 
conclusion). 
 28. Id. at 207. 
 29. Id. at 207–08. 
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parking increases driving, just as government-provided “free” pizza 
would increase the number of Americans eating pizza.30 
Thanks to the parking subsidy, more Americans drive to work, 
which in turn means that fewer people use public transit than 
would otherwise be the case, which means that public transit 
agencies have less revenue, which means that those transit agencies 
must raise fares or provide less service, which means that even 
fewer people ride public transit.31 And when more Americans drive, 
there is of course more demand for parking—which means that 
minimum parking requirements, by encouraging driving, may 
actually create parking shortages. 
D. Increased Housing Costs 
Minimum parking requirements reduce the true cost of car 
ownership by shifting the cost of parking into the cost of dwelling 
units, resulting in the subsidization of drivers by renters.32  Shoup 
asserts that minimum parking requirements may add as much as 
thirty-eight percent to the cost of developing apartments.33  
Consequently, municipal efforts to ease parking problems may 
exacerbate housing affordability problems. 
E. Bad for Business 
Off-street parking requirements restrict the redevelopment of 
older buildings, thereby discouraging infill development and 
 
 30. See ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE 
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 94 (2000) (“Of course there’s never enough 
parking!  If you gave everyone free pizza, would there be enough pizza?”). 
 31. See Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655, 665 (3d Cir. 
1989) (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (“[I]ncreases in fares or reductions in the quality or 
availability of service have the tendency of reducing ridership, and the reduction 
in ridership in turn diminishes revenue.”); Editorial, To Bus or Not to Bus, 
PROVIDENCE J. (Rhode Island), Oct. 18, 2004, at A8 (noting that cuts in bus service 
could “cause ridership to fall, deficits to swell and the ‘death spiral’ to become 
ever more costly to stop”). 
 32. See SHOUP, supra note 1, at 141. 
 33. Id. at 148–51 (noting that parking spaces required by the city of Los 
Angeles increased construction costs of the Weyburn Terrace apartment project by 
thirty-two percent and requirements by Palo Alto increased development costs of 
Alma Place, a federal low-income housing system, by thirty-eight percent).  But cf. 
TODD LITMAN, VICTORIA TRANSPORT POLICY INSTITUTE, PARKING REQUIREMENT 
IMPACTS ON HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 1 (2005), available at http://www.vtpi.org/ 
park-hour.pdf (“[O]ne parking space per unit increases costs by about 12.5%, and 
two parking spaces increase costs by about 25%.”) 
6
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forcing potential businesses out of established areas.34  Suppose, for 
instance, that a barbershop closes in a city which requires two 
parking spaces per barber, and that a beautician who hopes to 
open a beauty shop in the same location must, under city parking 
regulations, create three parking spaces per beautician.  Unless the 
beautician can obtain a zoning variance,35 she must either: (1) 
provide more parking spaces, or (2) move to another building with 
more parking space.  If the beautician’s shop is surrounded by 
other buildings, provision of additional parking may be 
impractical,36 so the beautician must move to another building with 
more space and allow the existing building to stay vacant unless 
another barber can be found for that location.37  Thus, minimum 
parking requirements can discourage redevelopment of existing 
buildings. 
This restriction on building redevelopment becomes 
particularly harsh and further stunts economic growth if a city 
increases its off-street parking requirements over time.38  Existing 
buildings that do not conform to the new parking requirements 
generally receive “grandfathered” rights to continue business 
under the previous parking regulation.39  But any change in 
building use triggers application of the new parking requirements, 
forcing nonconforming buildings to supply additional parking 
when redeveloped.40 
F.  Parking and the Poor 
Twenty-seven percent of households earning less than $20,000 
a year do not own a car, while ninety-nine percent of households 
with incomes greater than $75,000 own at least one car.41  
Nevertheless, these lower-income families, which are far more likely 
 
 34. SHOUP, supra note 1, at 153–54. 
 35. Id. at 153 (noting that variances are difficult to obtain due to cost and a 
time consuming process). 
 36. See id. at 98, 153–54. 
 37. Id. at 153–54. 
 38. See id. at 97–98. 
 39. See, e.g., Gladden v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 659 A.2d 249, 253–54 
(D.C. 1995). 
 40. See, e.g., Page Assocs. v. District of Columbia, 463 A.2d 649, 651 (D.C. 
1983) (explaining that Washington, D.C. zoning regulations require any building 
grandfathered from parking requirements to provide additional spaces when the 
building use is changed). 
 41. SHOUP, supra note 1, at 165. 
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to rely on public transportation,42 still finance “free” parking 
through increased prices for goods, services, and rent.43  So by 
redistributing income from drivers to nondrivers,44 minimum 
parking requirements redistribute income from the 
(disproportionately carless) poor to the relatively affluent majority. 
III. IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE? 
The most obvious solution to the negative side effects of 
parking regulation might be the complete elimination of parking 
regulation: just allow the free market to decide who can park 
where.  But cities have traditionally rejected this remedy out of 
concerns that drivers unable to find parking spaces would congest 
the streets in search of parking.  For example, the Colorado 
Supreme Court upheld one city’s minimum parking requirements 
on the ground that such regulations were a rational means of 
preventing drivers from “moving slowly around block from block 
seeking a place to park . . . clog[ging] the streets, air and ears of 
our citizens.”45  Shoup rejects this argument on the grounds that: 
(1) most cities require far more parking than is actually necessary 
to prevent parking shortages, and (2) less damaging alternatives 
could prevent such “cruising.” 
A. Why Minimum Parking Regulations are Overbroad 
In addition to attacking minimum parking requirements in 
principle, Shoup asserts that cities generally require landowners to 
provide more parking than drivers actually use. 
Planners generally base parking decisions not upon 
consumers’ willingness to pay, but rather on the collective hunches 
of nearby cities,46 which in turn are often based on Institute for 
Transportation Engineers (ITE) parking data.47  ITE engineers 
survey parking occupancy at various land uses, and create a 
 
 42. NAT’L CENTER FOR TRANSIT RESEARCH, PUBLIC TRANSIT IN AMERICA: RESULTS 
FROM THE 2001 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL SURVEY 37–43, 48 (2005), http:// 
www.nctr.usf.edu/pdf/527-09.pdf. 
 43. SHOUP, supra note 1, at 165. 
 44. See supra Part I.C. 
 45. City of Aspen v. Stroud, 532 P.2d 720, 723 (Colo. 1975). 
 46. See SHOUP, supra note 1, at 26 (forty-five percent of planners surveyed 
nearby cities to decide how much parking to require for various land uses). 
 47. Id.  (identifying ITE data as the second-most popular source of parking 
rules). 
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“parking generation” rate that measures the number of drivers who 
park at various types of enterprises.48  ITE data are flawed in two 
respects.  First, ITE data are based on data from sites with ample 
free parking and no public transit.49  Thus, planners who rely on 
ITE data create a self-fulfilling prophecy: they set parking 
requirements based on data from automobile-dependent places, 
which ensures that cities enact stringent minimum parking 
requirements, which in turn helps to create the automobile-
dependent places upon which ITE data are based.50  Second, ITE 
data are based upon parking during peak periods, and thus 
dramatically overestimate day-to-day parking demand,51 leading to 
government-mandated parking lots that are often more than half 
empty.52 
B. Cruising: A Curable Problem? 
As noted above, one common justification for minimum 
parking requirements is that by making it easy for drivers to use off-
street parking lots, such rules reduce the pollution and congestion 
commonly associated with “cruising” for on-street parking by 
drivers.53  Intuitively, consumers prefer unpriced parking to pay 
parking and while cruising for free parking is economically rational 
for the individual, it collectively harms society because it clogs 
traffic, wastes fuel, and causes air pollution.54  Shoup proposes two 
reforms to reduce cruising: (1) allowing landowners to avoid 
minimum parking requirements by paying “in lieu of parking” 
fees,55 and (2) setting market prices for on-street parking.56 
 
 48. Id. at 31–32. 
 49. Id. at 32. 
 50. See supra Parts I.A–C (explaining how minimum parking requirements 
spur automobile dependence). 
 51. Jeffrey Tumlin & Adam Millard-Bell, The Mythology of Parking, LINE MAG. 
(Mar. 2004), http://www.linemag.org/_line/article_template1_print.php?a_id= 
146 (last visited Feb. 22, 2007). 
 52. SHOUP, supra note 1, at 81 (citing various studies supporting this 
proposition).  In particular, Shoup cites an Urban Land Institute study showing 
that even during the busiest hour of the year, almost half of shopping center 
parking lots were never more than eighty-five percent filled.  Id. 
 53. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  A related concern is “spillover 
parking”—the use of parking spaces in residential areas by visitors to neighboring 
businesses, thus depriving residents of parking spaces.  See SHOUP, supra note 1, at 
433 (describing this problem); see also infra note 84 and accompanying text 
(explaining how Shoup would reduce spillover parking by using market pricing). 
 54. See SHOUP, supra note 1, at 276. 
 55. Id. at 229. 
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1. In-Lieu Fees 
Some cities allow developers to avoid minimum parking 
requirements by paying “in-lieu of parking” fees.  With in-lieu fees, 
developers pay a fee to fund public parking facilities instead of 
providing parking themselves for customers, visitors, and 
employees.57  Shoup prefers public parking to the status quo on the 
following grounds: 
• private facilities whose peak parking occurs at different times 
(such as an office building commonly used during the day 
and a restaurant commonly used at night) can share public 
parking, meaning that fewer parking spaces are required to 
meet peak demand;58 
• customers can park once and walk to multiple sites, reducing 
vehicle traffic;59 
• older buildings may be redeveloped for a new use without 
having to provide additional parking;60 
• fewer buildings will be surrounded by parking lots, as 
scattered parking spaces can be consolidated.61 
But in-lieu fees are not a perfect solution to the cruising 
problem.  Cities still tax landowners who pay such fees to subsidize 
parking and thus subsidize additional driving.62 
2. Institute Fair Market Pricing 
Ideally, Shoup would deter cruising by shifting to “fair market 
pricing” for on-street parking.  Today, on-street parking is generally 
cheap or free, but is regulated through government-imposed time 
limits on parking.63  This system encourages cruising, because 
 
 56. Id. at 297. 
 57. Id. at 229.  See also id. at 251–62, 266–67 (suggesting related alternatives of 
allowing employers to avoid minimum parking requirements if they paid for 
employees’ transit usage, and allowing landlords to avoid minimum parking 
requirements by subsidizing use of “car sharing” services by carless tenants); see 
generally Zipcar, http://www.zipcar.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) (web page of 
car sharing service, explaining concept). 
 58. See SHOUP, supra note 1, at 231. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Part II.C. (arguing that as long as parking is free, drivers are 
subsidized by landowners).  Shoup also questions whether cities will build parking 
spaces as cheaply and efficiently as individual developers.  See SHOUP, supra note 1, 
at 232. 
 63. See SHOUP, supra note 1, at 296. 
10
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cheap parking encourages people to drive to their destinations and 
then to cruise around an area searching for available free parking 
spaces.64  Moreover, a driver who needs to park for more than the 
maximum time will have to waste time moving a car to another 
space, thus clogging traffic.65 
In contrast, Shoup suggests that cities eliminate time limits for 
parking and instead charge a price that will deter just enough 
driving to eliminate parking shortages.  Specifically, he suggests 
that at any given time, prices should be just low enough (or high 
enough) so that about fifteen percent of curb spaces should remain 
vacant, and the rest should be occupied.66  After a city sets a price 
for parking in a certain location, it would periodically review prices 
to determine whether they produce the target occupancy rate; if 
the rates are too low, prices could be raised, while if the rates are 
too high, prices could be lowered.67 
Shifting to market pricing for parking allocates parking spaces 
in a fairer and more efficient manner than the current system.  
Increasing the price of parking to reflect consumer demand 
eliminates the indirect subsidy that all consumers, even those who 
do not own a personal vehicle, pay to all drivers.68  Instead, market 
pricing allocates parking spots to drivers who most desire them, 
because drivers who want spaces the most will pay the most.69  The 
most convenient parking spaces will be predominately used for 
relatively expensive short-term parking, and less convenient 
parking will typically be occupied by long-term parkers and by 
those who place a low value on time.70 
By eliminating parking shortages, market pricing will make it 
more politically feasible for cities to eliminate off-street parking 
requirements.71  Businesses and employers can then decide whether 
 
 64. Id. at 303. 
 65. See id. at 296–97.  Moreover, time limits are difficult to enforce.  Shoup 
cites a study in Seattle showing that the average parking duration in spaces with a 
one-hour time limit is over two hours.  Id. at 297. 
 66. Id. at 297–99.   Shoup suggests a “fifteen percent rule” because traffic 
engineers typically recommend a fifteen percent vacancy rate in order to ensure 
adequate ingress and egress from parking spaces.  Id. at 297, 316 n.6 (citing 
numerous commentators). 
 67. Id. at 300–03 (describing technical details). 
 68. Id. at 165. 
 69. Id. at 398–99. 
 70. Id. at 483. 
 71. Id. at 495–96.  See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that 
prevention of cruising is one justification for minimum parking requirements). 
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to subsidize parking for customers and employees; the choice will 
be theirs, instead of one made by a city planner.72  Businesses may 
prefer to lose a few customers on busy days rather than pay for 
parking that ordinarily remains empty, allowing these empty spaces 
to be put to more productive use.73 
It could be argued that market pricing of parking is just 
another tax, and is thus politically infeasible.  Shoup responds that 
unlike many taxes, parking fees discourage a socially noxious 
activity (cruising).74  Moreover, market-priced curb parking could 
be politically acceptable if parking meter revenue was used to 
benefit the areas with the parking meters.  Specifically, Shoup 
suggests that revenue from market-priced curb parking be given 
not to a city’s general treasury, but to neighborhood business 
improvement districts (BIDs) (that is, neighborhood associations in 
commercial districts),75 who will use the revenue for neighborhood 
improvements that make these areas cleaner and safer.76  If parking 
revenue funds are given to BIDs, BID members will be willing to 
support charging market prices for curb parking.77  Similarly, in 
residential areas, cities can create “parking benefit districts” in 
which residents will be given the right to park free in a district, 
while nonresidents will have to pay market price, and the resulting 
revenue will be earmarked for neighborhood improvements.78 
A more significant concern is that if market prices in one area 
(e.g. downtowns, which tend to be more compact and less parking-
dominated than suburbs)79 are higher than the market price in 
 
 72. SHOUP, supra note 1, at 497. 
 73. Id. at 91. 
 74. Id. at 291. 
 75. Id. at 401. 
 76. Id.  In BIDs, property owners voluntarily assess themselves to pay for “local 
public services that cities either do not provide (such as sidewalk cleaning) or do 
not provide at a satisfactory level (such as security) . . . because they recognize that 
their property’s value depends on the quality of the surrounding environment.”  
Id. 
 77. Id. at 401–02. 
 78. Id. at 434–37.  A more common system is a residential parking permit 
ordinance which flatly prohibits nonresidents from parking in residential 
neighborhoods.  See, e.g., County Bd. of Arlington County, Va. v. Richards, 434 
U.S. 5 (1977) (upholding such a law).  Shoup faults such prohibitions as an 
“overreaction” because they leave many parking spaces vacant and thus 
underused.  See SHOUP, supra note 1, at 433–34 (describing and criticizing such 
regulations). 
 79. SHOUP, supra note 1, at 158–59 (noting that parking lots are more 
expensive to build in dense downtown areas). 
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areas with a glut of off-street parking (e.g. suburban shopping 
centers), drivers may be deterred from visiting the former areas.  
Shoup responds by citing some success stories involving somewhat 
similar systems; for example, in Pasadena, California, and San 
Diego, California, cities substituted parking meters for free parking 
in order to finance neighborhood improvements such as street 
trees and street furniture, thus causing the revival of depressed 
business districts.80  But Pasadena and San Diego are growing 
cities,81 so neighborhoods in those cities might be reasonably likely 
to improve regardless of parking policy.  By contrast, it is not clear 
whether similar policies would be effective in downtowns of 
declining cities: in more marginal areas where citywide consumer 
demand is weaker, charging for parking might deter more visitors 
than are now deterred by parking shortages.82 
A related concern is that market pricing might be too 
successful, creating upper-class districts where parking is so 
expensive as to exclude low-income drivers.83  In the absence of 
further experimentation, there is no way of knowing whether such 
“exclusionary parking” will be a significant problem. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the wisdom of in-lieu parking fees or market 
prices for on-street parking, Shoup persuasively argues that 
minimum parking requirements create a cavalcade of unintended 
harmful consequences, such as less pedestrian-friendly streets, 
 
 80. Id. at 403–18 (describing improvements in downtown Pasadena); 418–27 
(describing improvements in various parts of San Diego).  But neither city has the 
kind of block-by-block market pricing system recommended by Shoup.  Pasadena 
charges the “unusually high” rate of $1 per hour for downtown meters and allows 
businesses to avoid off-street parking requirements by paying only $115 per year to 
the city.  Id. at 406, 408.  But it apparently does not charge different rates for 
different locations or seek to figure out a market price.  Similarly, San Diego sets a 
single price ($1.25 per hour) for all parking meters in the city.  Id. at 425. 
 81. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 
OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 34–35 (Pasadena’s population increased from 
118,000 to 144,000 between 1980 and 2004, while San Diego’s increased from 
876,000 to 1.2 million). 
 82. Shoup suggests that fewer shoppers would be deterred by more expensive 
parking than by the parking shortages caused by underpriced curb parking.  See 
SHOUP, supra note 1, at 398.  This argument depends on the assumption that even 
in the most depressed areas, parking shortages are so common that they are more 
of a deterrent than market-priced parking an assumption that may not be true for 
all neighborhoods. 
 83. I thank Elizabeth DeCoux for this insight. 
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higher rents, and higher prices for other goods and services.  As 
Shoup suggests, American cities should treat a restaurant’s parking 
spaces the way we treat a restaurant itself: “Planners don’t say how 
many restaurants a city must have.  We let the market provide as 
many restaurants as people are willing to pay for.  Similarly, 
planners should let developers provide as many off-street parking 
spaces as drivers are willing to pay for.”84 
Even if a free market in off-street parking might increase 
cruising, there is no reason to believe that this problem outweighs 
the negative consequences of existing regulations.  So when in 
doubt, we should give the free market a try. 
 
 
 84. See SHOUP, supra note 1, at 496. 
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